Not four years ago, the Bucks had an elite on-court product, massively spurred by stability and synergy from ownership on down. Now, despite the recent good form, the team is overall in a much worse spot, and while some of the reasons for that have been beyond the Bucks’ control, many have been within their control. Over the last three or so years, this franchise has made avoidable error after avoidable error, largely culminating in the current product.
What I noticed while investigating these errors is that many share a common theme: a lack of synergy between the franchise’s different arms and, in some cases, power brokers. More specifically, there was either a lack of conviction by the arm with decision-making responsibility to go with its gut, or an arm without that responsibility overruled the arm with it, resulting in a bad decision. Therefore, I decided to dive deep into three examples of this phenomenon in the following areas: coaching hires, injury management, and possibly even the drafting process. Let’s begin with coaching hires.
A heck of a mess: The post-Budenholzer hiring debacle
The Budenholzer-to-Griffin-to-Rivers fiasco was easily the most consequential example of how a lack of organisational synergy left the Bucks in a hot mess. Whatever you may think in hindsight, it was widely accepted in 2023 that coach Bud’s time had come, and a new voice was needed. The initial search was far-reaching, but in the end, the Bucks’ brain trust settled on three finalists: Nick Nurse, Kenny Atkinson, and Adrian Griffin.
Of course, they went with Adrian Griffin, who would go on to be about as incompetent as one can be in the top job, getting fired halfway through the first year of his three-year contract (yes, I know, 30-13 record; that was not because of anything he did, and I’ll stand on that forever). When you think about it, the only logical explanation as to why they didn’t just wait to fire Griff at the end of the year—when the replacement options would be plentiful—was that he was creating so much tension that it simply could not wait, which is bonkers.
So, who gets the blame for Griffin’s hiring? Marc Stein’s reporting states that Horst wanted Nurse, but Giannis wanted Griffin, and that won out. Now, you might think that’s your answer right there: Antetokounmpo is to blame. Sure, Giannis definitely deserves some blame; knowing his opinion carries such considerable weight, he probably should’ve done more homework. But overall, you’ll seldom hear me criticise a player for doing anything other than their play. My knee-jerk reaction is to blame Horst for not trusting himself, because his instincts about Nurse being the man for the job were probably right.
Then again, in the front office’s defence, the context of the 2023 offseason was clearly very relevant to Horst’s decision-making. The Bucks had just gotten bounced in the first round, and rumors were swirling about Antetokounmpo’s future (almost as much as they were in 2020) because he was extension-eligible. Therefore, it was understandable for the Bucks’ brain trust to both involve Giannis in the process and weigh his opinion so heavily that his preference overrode the GM’s.
Looking back, this leaves you in a pickle when evaluating if there was a “right move” or not. On the one hand, the Griffin era was an abject failure from a team standpoint, and it also led to utter chaos following his ouster. Injuries or not, the team was never going to be a contender under AG (or his replacement), which we sometimes forget is the entire goal behind all of this. On the other hand, assuming the initial coaching hire influenced Antetokounmpo’s decision to sign the extension (which, to be fair, we don’t actually know for certain), the Griffin hire was objectively a successful move!
But let’s move on from that and briefly discuss the Doc Rivers hire in more detail. There were a few options on the table. Nick Nurse had taken the head job in Philly, so he was out, but Kenny Atkinson was still available. Kevin O’Connor’s reporting states that Horst wanted Atkinson but was overruled by the ownership group, who wanted Doc Rivers. So once again, the lack of synergy reared its ugly head. The front office wanted one guy, whom they had already vetted extensively, but were overruled by the ownership group.
Which leads us to where we’re at now. The Rivers hire has gone about as expected. Had Giannis signed the extension under Nurse or Atkinson, the franchise at large would likely be in a much better position right now. However, the reality is that we don’t know if he would have signed under another coach, as crazy as that sounds in hindsight, making Horst’s decision to hire Griffin easily defensible. Who to blame for the Doc hire, though, seems pretty unambiguous. Giannis was not a factor, and Horst had a strong candidate ready to go; unfortunately, ownership decided they wanted to run point on that one, completely bungling it.
Playing with fire: Questions around the injury management of Giannis
I can apply this framework to the situation that has played out with Giannis’ continued calf injuries. In his recent interview with the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Antetokounmpo admitted he returned too early from his initial calf injury this season, which we can only assume led to his reinjury about a month ago (at least in part). My question is: knowing what we know about calf injuries, how was there any world in which he returned in anything other than tip-top condition the first time around?
Look, I’ll guess that the 65-game rule for award eligibility had something to do with it from Giannis’ end. Not that it matters, but my personal response to that is blunt: I don’t care. He needs to know that his health is more important than some award (p.s., this is why the 65-game rule is stupid, but I digress). But then there’s the more pressing questions surrounding the game in which he reinjured that calf, the main one being: why was he allowed to continue playing when it was clear he wasn’t right? The broadcast kept pointing it out; those watching could see it. Heck, Doc even admitted it himself!
“I thought he was favoring it for most of the second half. I asked our [medical staff] five different times. I didn’t like what my eyes were seeing, personally. Giannis was defiant about staying in. On that one play, seeing him try to run down the floor, to me, I’d had enough. I didn’t ask, I just took him out.“
And yet and still, Rivers didn’t take him out until right at the end when he couldn’t move? Oh, how noble of him. Doc referred to notifying the medical staff “five different times,” and they also didn’t demand he come out? Huh? Going back through some of Antetokounmpo’s postgame quotes from that night made me incredibly frustrated.
“I don’t like to quit. I couldn’t explode, jog, get on my toes, so I was jogging on my heels. I didn’t have the same explosiveness, but I still felt like I could help. But then at the end, when it popped, I had to get out.”
“I was feeling it [for] a majority of the game, but I did not want to stop playing. But at the end, I could not move, so I had to stop.”
It is baffling to me that he wasn’t taken out the second he felt discomfort (in a random game in a lost season, no less). The man fully admitted he wasn’t feeling right for a majority of the game, was changing his running biomechanics because of it, and people did nothing because they presumably didn’t want to be the “bad guy” and save him from himself. That is crazy to me. What makes Antetokounmpo so great is that he’ll do anything to win, including playing through pain—it’s the Bucks’ duty of care to stand in his way. And judging from these quotes, how could there be any other conclusion than that they failed in that duty of care?
Sliding doors moment: Was Milwaukee about to select Kyshawn George before Jon Horst stepped in?
Something in the media surfaced recently that made me question how the Bucks’ drafting process works and whether that department is another lacking trust and synergy. And I want to be clear upfront that I am putting on my tinfoil hat and 100% speculating here, which I don’t love to do, but honestly, I just had to put this in writing. My question is: how trusted are the scouts, who work exclusively on the draft, to make selections on draft night?
What prompted this thought for me? Well, I listen to the Old Man And The Three podcast. Recently, they recorded an episode with some of the Washington Wizards’ young core: Kyshawn George, Alex Sarr, and Bilal Coulibaly. On the podcast, each player discussed their pre-draft process and the teams they worked out with and/or had interest from. George (14:45–15:03) singled out just one team, Milwaukee, as the franchise he believed was likely to select him:
“To be honest, I had a couple teams that I had really, really, really good feedback [with], and it was kind of my floor, and they didn’t pick me”
“Which team?”
“The team was Milwaukee, actually. I had an individual workout with them; that went pretty well. Had pretty good feedback from them. And then after [they didn’t pick me], I was like, ‘oh, I guess we’re going to have to see.’”
Whether you, like many online, read that as a “promise” from the Bucks or not, it’s clear that, at minimum, there was significant interest. Of course, Milwaukee would select AJ Johnson instead, and Washington would snap up Kyshawn George with the very next pick. Now, hearing that reminded me that the Bucks themselves made an all-access video of their 2024 draft. I rewatched this video out of curiosity and found quite an interesting nugget (2:08–2:17) relating to their picking Johnson, and that was the wording Jon Horst used to announce it:
“With what we see on the board, we’re going to go for a big swing here. We’re going to change the board a little bit. We’re going to take AJ Johnson.”
Again, I have no way of confirming this, but it seems relatively clear that Horst made an executive decision to override the draft board and, by his own admission, “swing.” Recall that AJ Johnson was not seen as a first-round pick by the NBA at large, evidenced by his not receiving a green room invite (unlike Kyshawn George). Would he really have been rated as a first-round guy by the Bucks? Regardless, the pick missed by a country mile and, in hindsight, the Bucks were lucky to get off AJ when he still had “intrigue.”
Granted, teams miss in the 20s all the time, but this one hurt a little extra because we know from George’s own admission that he was nearly a Buck. Ironically, this situation is eerily similar to the 2022 draft, when, per the Zach Lowe Show (51:05–52:05), the Bucks worked out Andrew Nembhard twice and also loved him, only to use their pick on MarJon Beauchamp. To put it bluntly, Milwaukee identified two studs late in the first round who’d each go ~20 spots higher in a redraft, were reportedly at the 10-yard line with both, only to pass on them for two busts who’d go ~20 spots lower in a redraft. Sliding doors, man. Sliding doors.
And sure, this isn’t really the same as the other separation-of-powers arguments I’ve made, as Jon Horst does play a key role in scouting and drafting; these aren’t “separate arms” getting in each other’s way. It also could very well be a one-off situation. But it’s fair to say that scouts, unlike Horst, are singularly focused on the draft year-round, and thus their opinions should hold a lot of weight in this specific area. If Horst indeed overrode the draft board to take a consensus second-round prospect at 23, he’d better have been confident that the prospect would turn out good (or even average!), which they did not. Not even close.
Well, there you have it. I think it’s more than fair to say a lack of synergy and trust from top to bottom in the Bucks organisation has played a key role in their demise. It’s clear that as the franchise approaches another major inflection point in the offseason, that can no longer continue. At the same time, it’s not all bad. The Bucks have made a bunch of shrewd moves around the edges that help to make up for these mistakes. Unearthing Ryan Rollins and AJ Green has, in many ways, saved them. Ousmane Dieng’s first few games have been beyond exciting. Kevin Porter Jr. and Cam Thomas are both flawed but awfully talented. There’s a lot to be excited about, but no franchise runs well when different factions are on different wavelengths.